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Biosecurity in trapping wildlife is an important consideration regarding 
animal and human welfare. It is also important regarding minimising the 
risk of cross-contamination of samples obtained from trapped wildlife, to 
ensure validity of epidemiological studies dependent on such samples. 
This paper describes practical approaches to biosecurity in trapping and 
sampling wildlife, and approaches to evaluating data to assess the potential 
impact of cross-contamination, using our study of the marsupials quenda 
(syn. southern brown bandicoots, Isoodon obesulus) and brushtail possums 
(Trichosurus vulpecula) as an example. Biosecurity considerations include 
management of traps, handling bags, animal handlers and sampling 
equipment. Various approaches to data analyses can be used to assess 
whether cross-contamination is likely to have substantially impacted study 
results.
Introduction
 Trapping and subsequent sampling of animals is an integral part of research involving 
wildlife. However, this entails biosecurity risks that potentially affect animal and 
human welfare due to anthropozoonoses (in the context of wildlife trapping, that is 
infections that can spread from wildlife to humans, and vice versa) and anthropogenic 
spread of infections within and between wildlife populations [1,2]. Additionally, poorly 
managed biosecurity in trapping may result in cross-contamination of samples from 
different animals, which may cause substantial misclassification bias or measurement 
error in epidemiological studies dependent on trapping for sample collection. Such 
bias may substantially impact prevalence estimates, and lead to errors in interpretation 
of data.
 Thus, biosecurity in trapping and sampling methodology, and the potential impact 
of cross-contamination on data obtained from trapping, require consideration. The 
purpose of this paper is to describe practical approaches to biosecurity in trapping and 
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sampling wildlife, and approaches to evaluating data for potential impact of cross-
contamination, using our own study of quenda (syn. southern brown bandicoots, 
Isoodon obesulus) and brushtail possums (Trichosurus vulpecula) in the greater 
Perth region, Western Australia [3], as an example. The quenda and brushtail possum 
study was undertaken under Murdoch University Animal Ethics Permit R2530/12, 
and Department of Parks and Wildlife Regulation 17 (SF009640) and Regulation 4 
(CE004287) permits.
The potential for cross-contamination of samples in trapping wildlife
 Trapping of wildlife typically occurs across multiple days and / or nights in a 
particular location. Animals may be in traps overnight, and defaecate repeatedly. If 
faecal samples collected from traps are contaminated with faeces of animals trapped 
previously, results of faecal analyses for that animal may not be accurate. This may 
be particularly the case if samples are screened with highly sensitive molecular / PCR 
based tests [4].
  In sampling small-to-medium sized wildlife species, cloth or hessian handling bags 
are often deployed to restrain the animal. Handling bags may become contaminated 
by an animal’s ectoparasites and faeces. Ectoparasites documented on an animal as a 
result of exposure via a contaminated handling bag will not provide data that represent 
the true epidemiology of ectoparasitism within that population. Cross-contamination 
of faecal samples could have the same effect where faecal-borne pathogens are of 
interest. 
 For example, our study investigated the epidemiology of gastrointestinal and 
macroscopic ectoparasites in quenda and brushtail possums in the greater Perth 
region [3]. Ninety nine percent (284 / 287) of trapped quenda and 97.0% (32 / 33) 
of trapped brushtail possums defaecated in the trap, and 25.4% quenda and 39.4% 
brushtail possums were trapped subsequent to another mammal being in the trap. 
As our study involved identifying gastrointestinal parasites in trapped marsupials by 
testing their faecal samples, implementation of biosecurity measures and evaluation 
of data to assess the possible impact of cross contamination on results were important 
regarding the validity of study findings, in addition to being important for animal 
welfare. Similarly, ectoparasites were present in 36.9% of quenda and 9.1% of 
brushtail possum handling bags, and faeces were present in 1.4% of quenda and 9.1% 
of brushtail possum handling bags, so from early in the study the use of clean handling 
bags for each trapped animal was confirmed as an important measure regarding 
biosecurity and avoiding cross-contamination of samples from individuals. The 
subsequent identification of an exceptionally high prevalence of Giardia spp. infection 
in the quenda faecal samples then prompted data analyses to identify whether cross-
contamination may have plausibly influenced this finding.  
General hygiene principles around which biosecurity practices can be designed
 Traps
 In the field, traps can be readily cleaned, using paper towels and a broad-spectrum 
bactericidal, virucidal and fungicidal disinfectant spray to remove organic matter from 
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the trap after an animal has occupied it. The disinfectant can then be sprayed around the 
trap and left for at least the minimum contact time recommended by the manufacturer 
before the trap is reopened. Contact time varies depending on the product used - 
whilst manufacturer recommendations often indicate a five to ten minute contact time 
to disinfect for a wide range of pathogens, with up to half an hour required for more 
resistant viruses, provided organic matter has been removed prior to disinfection [e.g. 
5], contact times of up to one minute often provide substantial reductions in microbial 
contamination [6]. 
 Where cage traps are in use, placing traps on newspaper facilitates collection of 
faecal samples and helps minimise ground contamination with faeces. If the newspaper 
is disturbed and there is substantial ground contamination with faeces, the trap can be 
moved to an adjacent suitable location. This will likely decrease the risk of cross-
contamination of faecal samples. Newspaper requires changing after an animal has 
occupied the trap.
  Between trapping sites, traps can be thoroughly scrubbed to remove all organic 
matter, soaked in broad-spectrum bactericidal, virucidal and fungicidal disinfectant 
for the recommended contact time, and dried. This is likely to minimise the risk of 
spread of infection and cross-contamination between sites. The use of disinfectant 
did not influence trapping rates in studies of a variety of small mammalian wildlife 
species [e.g. 7, 8, 9, 10]. Anecdotally, the use of disinfectant in our study did not 
appear to deter quenda and brushtail possums, as individuals were commonly trapped 
in traps that had been cleaned with disinfectant in situ at least once (and up to three 
times) prior. 
 Handling bags
 Using a clean handling bag for each animal is readily achievable. Used handling 
bags can be cleared of ectoparasites and faeces, and then thoroughly laundered and 
dried, prior to use with another animal. 
 Animal handlers
 The risk of cross-contamination of samples - as well as transfer of many infections 
between animals, or between personnel and animals - is likely to be substantially 
reduced if personnel directly handling animals wear disposable gloves, and change 
gloves between animals- as per human clinical settings [11, 12, 13]. Hand sanitiser - 
readily available in field friendly, alcohol based preparations - is a valuable adjunct 
to a rigorous glove use protocol, though is not adequate as an exclusive hand-hygiene 
measure [14], particularly in field circumstances where thorough hand washing prior 
to hand sanitiser use is generally not possible. 
 Equipment
 Broad-spectrum bactericidal, virucidal and fungicidal disinfectant spray is readily 
included in field equipment. Wiping organic matter off all equipment that comes into 
direct contact with an animal, and then spraying with disinfectant and observing 
recommended contact times before use in the next animal is considered likely to 
reduce the risk of cross-contamination of samples, as well as spread of infection. 
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Assessing the likelihood of cross-contamination substantially influencing 
epidemiological data
 Post hoc assessment of the potential impact of cross-contamination on research 
data can quantify potential impact on study results. This allows assessment of the 
likelihood of results being substantially influenced by cross-contamination. We use 
the results of testing quenda for the faecal-borne protozoan parasite genus Giardia in 
our survey to outline the particular approaches we employed.
 In our study, the quenda Giardia spp. isolates were characterised by PCR and 
sequencing at three loci: 18S rRNA, ITS1-5.8s-ITS2 and gdh [15]. The results of these 
analyses indicated that the Giardia spp. infections were almost invariably Giardia 
peramelis. As the only confirmed host of G. peramelis, quenda were identified and 
focussed on as the most likely source of cross-contamination regarding the Giardia 
spp. results in this study. 
 Of the 284 trapped quenda from which we obtained faeces, 99 were found to be 
infected with Giardia sp. Of these, eleven quenda tested positive for Giardia sp. after 
being trapped subsequent to another Giardia sp. positive quenda. Based on genetic 
variation within the sequence data generated for G. peramelis, it was found that the 
G. peramelis infection in one of these quenda displayed genetic variation from the 
G. peramelis isolate obtained from the quenda trapped prior. This indicated that the 
G. peramelis infection identified in this quenda was not plausibly the result of cross-
contamination from faeces of the quenda trapped prior. The remaining ten quenda had 
Giardia sp. infections that were not genetically distinguishable from the infection of 
the quenda trapped prior, and so remained candidates for possible cross-contamination 
of the faecal samples. 
 The burden of infection provides a further indicator of the likelihood of cross-
contamination. For example, particularly where biosecurity has been considered 
in trap management strategies, it is unlikely that if a faecal sample from an animal 
trapped subsequent to an infected animal was contaminated with Giardia spp., 
rather than intrinsically infected, that it would have a burden of infection that greatly 
exceeded that of the previously trapped animal. Furthermore, the probability of 
cross-contamination is likely to increase (or at the very least, stay the same) with a 
heavier burden of infection in the initially trapped animal. In our study, Giardia spp. 
cyst burdens on immunofluorescence microscopy of the quenda samples were noted 
and compared. Of the ten quenda identified above as potential candidates for cross-
contamination, four had at least a four-fold higher burden of Giardia spp. cysts on 
immunofluorescence microscopy than the Giardia spp. positive quenda trapped before 
them. Though not conclusive, this suggests that these positive samples represented 
intrinsic infection in that animal, rather than cross-contamination. Additionally, of all 
quenda (both positive and negative for Giardia spp.) that were trapped subsequent to 
Giardia spp. positive quenda, those that were trapped after the three quenda who were 
shedding the most Giardia spp. cysts in their faeces all tested negative.
 Finally, we used data analysis to compare the odds of Giardia spp. infection in 
quenda trapped subsequent to a Giardia spp. positive quenda, to the odds of Giardia 
spp. infection in quenda not trapped subsequent to a known Giardia spp. positive 
quenda. Using logistic regression, we found that there was no association between a 
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quenda being trapped subsequent to a Giardia spp. positive quenda and the odds of 
testing positive for Giardia spp. (p = 0.97). Quenda trapped subsequent to a Giardia 
spp. positive quenda had 1.03 times the odds of testing positive for Giardia spp. 
infection, compared to those trapped in a trap that had not been previously occupied 
by an infected quenda (95% CI 0.22 – 4.79). 
Conclusion
 Biosecurity in the trapping of wildlife deserves attention at the study design, 
field data collection, and data analysis stages. It is important for research rigour, 
and also for human and animal welfare. Depending on laboratory data available, 
it may be possible to demonstrate that cross-contamination of samples was highly 
implausible. Additionally, a variety of data analyses may either provide support that 
cross-contamination is not likely to have substantially influenced results, or alert the 
researcher to potential problems regarding contamination so that associated data are 
interpreted with due caution.
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